@codevibe_technology/sign-pdf
The PDF side of Codevibe Sign. It checks uploaded files, draws signatures and field values onto the pages, appends a signing certificate, and seals the result with a PAdES signature so any later change is detectable. It also verifies that seal against the certificate you trust.
Node 20 or later. Built on pdf-lib, @signpdf and node-forge.
Install
pnpm add @codevibe_technology/sign-pdf @codevibe_technology/sign-coreUsage
import { readFile } from 'node:fs/promises';
import {
appendCertificate,
inspectPdf,
renderFields,
seal,
sealCertificate,
sha256Hex,
verify,
} from '@codevibe_technology/sign-pdf';
// 1. On upload: reject encrypted, broken, oversized or overly complex files (read in a
// worker thread under limits) and record page sizes.
const original = new Uint8Array(await readFile('offer.pdf'));
const { pageCount, pages } = await inspectPdf(original, { maxBytes: 10 * 1024 * 1024 });
const sha256 = sha256Hex(original);
// `pages` maps directly onto core's Document.pageSizes.
// 2. When the envelope completes: draw every value (on a copy stripped of scripts and
// actions, forms flattened), add the certificate, seal.
const signed = await renderFields(original, envelope.fields, envelope.values, envelope.recipients, {
documentId: document.id,
timeZone: 'Asia/Kolkata',
});
const withCertificate = await appendCertificate(signed, {
envelope,
document,
events, // the envelope's audit events, in order
timeZone: 'Asia/Kolkata',
});
const p12 = new Uint8Array(await readFile(process.env.SEAL_P12_PATH!));
const passphrase = process.env.SEAL_P12_PASSPHRASE;
const sealed = await seal(withCertificate, {
p12,
passphrase,
reason: 'Signed with Codevibe Sign',
location: 'Bengaluru, India',
});
// 3. Any time later: check the file is exactly what your certificate sealed.
const operator = sealCertificate({ p12, passphrase }); // keep operator.sha256 or operator.pem
const check = await verify(sealed, { trust: { fingerprints: [operator.sha256] } });
// { valid: true, trustedBy: 'certificate', signer: { commonName, organization },
// signedAt, certificateSha256, seal: { ... } }All failures throw a SignError from @codevibe_technology/sign-core with a stable code and, where it helps, details that name the field or option to fix.
API
inspectPdf(bytes, { maxBytes?, limits? }) → Promise<{ pageCount, pages: { width, height }[] }>
Page sizes are in PDF points as the page is displayed: the crop box, with width and height swapped for pages rotated 90 or 270 degrees. This is the space field rects live in. maxBytes defaults to 25 MB.
Use it on every upload. Before the file is parsed on your thread, a worker thread reads it under limits and is terminated if it runs out of time, so one hostile file cannot block the event loop or exhaust memory:
| Limit | Default | Refuses |
|---|---|---|
maxPages | 500 | More pages than this. |
maxObjects | 100 000 | More indirect objects than this. |
maxDepth | 64 | Arrays and dictionaries, or the page tree, nested deeper than this. |
maxDecodedBytes | 50 MB | Compressed streams that inflate to more than this, together. |
timeoutMs | 10 s | Files that take longer to read; the worker is killed. |
The worker also has a 512 MB heap; a file that needs more is refused. checkParseLimits(bytes, limits?) runs the same check on its own, and DEFAULT_PARSE_LIMITS holds the defaults.
Errors: DOCUMENT_TOO_LARGE; DOCUMENT_INVALID with details.reason of encrypted, unreadable, empty, timeout or limit (then details.limit names it, with details.max).
sha256Hex(bytes) → string
Lowercase hex SHA-256.
renderFields(pdfBytes, fields, values, recipients, options?) → Promise<Uint8Array>
Draws each field onto its page. Rects use core's convention (points from the top-left of the displayed page); rotated pages and offset crop boxes are handled, and content is drawn upright as the reader sees it.
The pages are first copied into a fresh document without active content: /OpenAction and /AA actions, JavaScript, embedded files, launch, URI and every other action except in-document links, file attachment and media annotations, and XFA. Form fields are flattened into the page. Outlines, the structure tree and objects the pages do not use are left behind, and the output is a newly written file, never an incremental update. The same step is available on its own as sanitizePdf(bytes).
signature,initials: PNG as base64 (a is accepted). Each image is re-encoded before it is embedded: the header must declare at most 2048 × 2048 pixels, the pixel data must inflate to exactly the size the header implies, every chunk checksum and scanline filter must be valid, and only the header, palette, transparency and freshly compressed pixels are kept. Scaled to fit the box, aspect ratio kept, centred.text,name,date_signed: Helvetica, sized down (to 6 pt) and wrapped to fit; text that still does not fit is cut with an ellipsis.namefalls back to the recipient's name anddate_signedto the recipient'sactedAt. Dates print as19 Nov 2026.checkbox:'true'or'false'; a box is drawn, with a tick when checked.
Boxes that run off the page are trimmed to it.
| Option | Default | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
documentId | all | Draw only the fields of this document. |
font | none | TTF/OTF bytes for text outside Latin script. |
timeZone | UTC | IANA zone used to turn a date_signed timestamp into a date. |
formatDate | none | (isoValue) => string for date_signed text. |
maxImageBytes | 1 MB | Largest signature image. |
maxBytes | 25 MB | Largest input PDF. |
Errors: REQUIRED_FIELDS_MISSING (details.fieldIds), INVALID_FIELD_VALUE (bad image, checkbox value, or characters the font cannot draw), RECIPIENT_NOT_FOUND, VALIDATION (page out of range, box outside the page, unknown time zone).
appendCertificate(pdfBytes, data, options?) → Promise<Uint8Array>
Appends one or more A4 pages titled "Signing certificate". data is { envelope, document, events, timeZone?, generatedAt? } using core's types. The pages show:
- envelope id, title, status and its key times;
- document name, page count, the original SHA-256 (
document.sha256) and the SHA-256 ofpdfBytes, the final signed content before the certificate and seal; - each recipient: name, role, email or phone masked lightly (
s****@example.com,+91******3210), authentication method, status, IP address and user agent of their decisive action, and when they viewed, signed or approved, or declined (with the reason); - the audit chain head and every event with its time, action and who did it.
Times are shown in UTC, followed by the given time zone. Long values wrap; tables continue on new pages with their header repeated.
options: font (as above) and maxBytes.
seal(pdfBytes, options) → Promise<Uint8Array>
Applies a PAdES baseline B-B signature: SubFilter ETSI.CAdES.detached, SHA-256 with RSA, signed attributes content-type, message-digest and signing-certificate-v2, signing time in the signature dictionary. The seal covers the whole file.
| Option | Purpose |
|---|---|
p12 | PKCS#12 (.p12/.pfx) bytes with an RSA key and its cert. |
passphrase | The file's passphrase. |
reason | Shown by PDF readers. Has a sensible default. |
location | Optional. |
contactInfo | Optional. |
signingTime | Defaults to now. Must fall inside the certificate validity. |
maxBytes | Largest input PDF, 25 MB by default. |
allowWeakKey | Local development only; see below. |
The key must be RSA of at least 2048 bits and the certificate signed with SHA-256 or stronger, and valid (not expired, not yet to start) at the signing time. allowWeakKey: true accepts shorter keys and SHA-1 certificates, for throwaway keys in local development; never set it in production.
The certificate is the operator's, not the signer's: it proves the file has not changed since sealing. Signer intent is proven by the certificate pages and the audit trail. Errors: SEAL_FAILED (bad file or passphrase, no RSA key, weak key or certificate with details.keyBits or details.signatureAlgorithm, certificate not valid at the signing time) and the DOCUMENT_* codes above.
sealCertificate({ p12, passphrase?, allowWeakKey?, at? }) → SealCertificate
Opens the PKCS#12 file with the same checks as seal() and returns { pem, sha256, subject, notBefore, notAfter }. Call it at start-up to fail early, and keep sha256 (or pem) as what verify() should trust.
verify(bytes, { trust, limits? }) → Promise<VerifyResult>
The check to use when deciding whether a file is genuine. valid is true only when:
- the file has exactly one signature, found through its form's signature field;
- that signature is cryptographically intact (see
verifySeal); - it covers every byte of the file, so nothing was appended after sealing;
- the signer certificate is one you trust: its SHA-256 is in
trust.fingerprints, it is one oftrust.certificates(PEM or DER), or it chains through the certificates in the signature to one oftrust.rootsand was valid at the signing time.
trust must name at least one certificate, fingerprint or root. The file is read under the parser limits in a worker first, as in inspectPdf.
interface VerifyResult {
valid: boolean;
reason?:
| 'not_sealed'
| 'multiple_signatures'
| 'signature_invalid'
| 'not_whole_document'
| 'untrusted_signer';
signer?: { commonName?: string; organization?: string };
signedAt?: string;
certificateSha256?: string; // of the signer certificate
trustedBy?: 'certificate' | 'root';
seal: SealVerification; // the low-level result below
}Keep the certificates of earlier keys in trust after a rotation, so files they sealed keep verifying.
verifySeal(bytes) → Promise<SealVerification>
The low-level check verify() builds on. It takes the first signed signature field of the document's form (text that only looks like a signature dictionary is ignored), and checks that its byte range is well formed and brackets the /Contents the field declares, /Contents holds exactly the CMS structure (any change to it, even in padding, fails), the message digest matches the signed bytes, the signing-certificate-v2 hash matches the embedded certificate, and the RSA signature verifies.
interface SealVerification {
sealed: boolean; // a signature is present
valid: boolean; // it is intact and matches the bytes it covers
coversWholeDocument: boolean; // false if anything was appended after sealing
signer?: { commonName?: string; organization?: string };
signedAt?: string; // ISO time
signatureCount: number;
}valid says nothing about who sealed the file: anyone can seal an altered copy with their own key and verifySeal will call it valid. It also runs without parser limits. Use verify() with your operator certificate to decide whether a file is genuine.
maskEmail(email), maskPhone(phone)
The masking used on the certificate, for reuse in emails and screens.
Fonts and scripts
The standard fonts cover Latin script only. Names, titles or text in other scripts (Devanagari, Tamil, and so on) need a font that covers them, passed as font to renderFields and appendCertificate, for example Noto Sans Devanagari:
const font = new Uint8Array(await readFile('NotoSansDevanagari-Regular.ttf'));
await renderFields(pdf, fields, values, recipients, { font });
await appendCertificate(signed, data, { font });Without it, those calls fail with a message pointing at options.font rather than drawing the wrong glyphs. The font is embedded whole (not subset). Shaping for complex scripts comes from fontkit; it handles conjuncts and vowel signs, but check the output with the font you choose.
Limits
- Sealing keys must be RSA. Encrypted PDFs are rejected rather than decrypted.
- Sealing rewrites the file; seal last, and do not seal a file that already carries someone else's signature.
verifyandverifySeallocate signatures through the form's signature fields and check PAdES B-B seals like the ones produced here. They are not a general PDF signature validator: no revocation checks, timestamps or long-term validation.- Sanitising drops document-level features such as bookmarks and the tagged structure tree.